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

MEMOIR

ON

THE ORGANIZATION

OF

The Army of the United States,

WITH A VIEW

TO ITS

GIVING EFFECT

TO

THE MILITIA,

WHEN

CALLED INTO ACTUAL SERVICE.

Georgetown, D. C.

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Sept 30, 1891.

MEMOIR.

The first military establishment supported by the United States after the revolutionary war, was a small corps raised for the purpose of keeping peace on the Indian frontiers, and for occupying some of our principal forts erected on the seaboard. Since the adoption of the Constitution, which now forms the supreme law of the land, the United States have constantly maintained a military establishment. This establishment was augmented or diminished according to circumstances; but never had received any organization, with a view to permanency, until the close of the war in 1815. It will hardly be necessary to recite all the modifications as to organization and numerical strength, which the various acts of congress gave to the military establishment, or to show the causes which led to the many changes which it underwent in the course of thirty-six years; the object of this memoir being to propose some improvements in our present military establishment, by giving it a permanent organization, and adapting it to a state of peace as well as a state of war. The main spring of an army is its general staff, the organization of which must in a great measure depend upon the country in which it is to act. The staff of the United States should be so organized in peace, as to be capable of being extended in time of war to all the circumstances which may grow out of the exigencies of a state of war,

while the principles of its organization should be unchanged thereby. It would therefore be proper that the staff be composed of every department essential to the operations of an army; and although in time of peace acting on a miniature scale, still it should be susceptible of being enlarged, and extending its rules and regulations to any number of forces, however large or small, united or detached. Hence in time of peace all the regulations for the government of the staff, and of every arm of the service, should be settled and acted upon, in order that the practice might the more readily obtain in time of war, and be introduced among the new troops and the militia, without difficulty or embarrassment. This, then, is the time for establishing a uniform system for the infantry, cavalry, and artillery; which, when once established, should not be subject to any alterations, except upon the most grave considerations, and after having the most convincing proof of their necessity.

The system of tactics ought to be uniform throughout, and that for the several arms ought, as far as possible, to conform to each other. It ought to be simple and easy of comprehension, avoiding all unnecessary manœuvres and complicated movements, which are never used in real service, and which only tend to embarrass new troops, and to render the system difficult for the militia, without producing any beneficial results, unless indeed it were to render the military profession so complicated that it could be acquired only by a long or regular course of instruction, and thus obliging the government to resort to regular troops for any efficient service. The system which we now have, is undoubtedly framed on true principles; but is unnecessarily complicated, and might be much simplified. In the revolutionary war, and a long time after,

the work which contained the regulations of the infantry, and indeed for the whole army, was printed in a very small book, easy of comprehension, and produced sufficient order and regularity for all the purposes of parade and war, and could be readily learnt in the course of a few days; it wanted only the *eschellon* formations to render it complete. A work something of the same character, is now much wanted for our militia; and should be formed on the system adopted for the regular army, leaving *the greater works* to be studied by those who might desire to pursue the higher branches of tactics. In the organization of the military establishment, the militia must be regarded; and this organization should have in view the perfecting of the militia system, and the rendering effective that great portion of our military force. The military establishment of the United States should therefore be so organized, that while it is capable of extending itself, it may be able to afford the best means of giving efficiency to the great natural arm of the republic, THE MILITIA. And it is accordingly proposed, in the sequel, to offer some reflections on the classification and organization of the Militia, with a view to the defence of the country against attacks from abroad, and the maintenance of order, and the support of the laws within the republic.

The present military establishment of the United States is perhaps reduced to its minimum. It consists of a general staff, pretty well organized; four regiments of artillery, and seven regiments of infantry; and a corps of engineers. The artillery occupy the forts on the seaboard from Maine to Louisiana, and have charge of the arsenals or ordnance depots; and the infantry for the most part, are stationed on the Indian frontiers. There is be-

sides these, the Military Academy at West Point, composed of instructers and 250 cadets, and a School of Artillery practice at Fortress Monroe, on Old Point Comfort, in Virginia; the latter being merely for instruction, without augmenting the numerical force of the army.

The organization of the Army is as follows:

GENERAL STAFF.

Major General,	1
Brigadier Generals,	2
Adjutant General,	1
Inspector Generals,	2
Quarter Master General,	1
Quarter Masters,	4
Commissary General of Subsistence,	1
Paymaster General,	1
Paymasters,	14
Commissary General of Purchases,	1
Military Storekeepers,	2
Surgeon General,	1
Surgeons,	8
Assistant Surgeons,	45
Topographical Engineers and Assistants,	10

NOTE.—There are also Assistant Quarter Masters and 50 Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, who are taken from the line.

REGIMENTS AND CORPS.

Rank.	Engineers	1st Art'y.	2d Art'y.	3d Art'y.	4th Art'y.	Ordnance		1st Inf'y.	2d Inf'y.	3d Inf'y.	4th Inf'y.	5th Inf'y.	6th Inf'y.	7th Inf'y.	Total.
Colonels,	1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Lt. Colonels,	1	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	12
Majors,	2	1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	13
Captains,	6	9	9	9	9	4		10	10	10	10	10	10	10	116
1st Lieutenants,	6	18	18	18	18			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	148
2d Lieutenants,	6	18	18	18	18			10	10	10	10	10	10	10	148
Serg. Majors,		1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Qr. M. Sergeants,		1	1	1	1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	11
Sergeants,		36	36	36	36			30	30	30	30	30	30	30	354
Corporals,		36	36	36	36			40	40	40	40	40	40	40	424
P. Musicians,								2	2	2	2	2	2	2	14
Musicians,		18	18	18	18			20	20	20	20	20	20	20	212
Ord'n. Laborers,						56									56
Artificers,		27	27	27	27										108
Privates,		378	378	378	378			420	420	420	420	420	420	420	4452
Total Com'd.	22	48	48	48	48	4		33	33	33	33	33	33	33	449
Total non-Com'd.		497	497	497	497	56		514	514	514	514	514	514	514	5692
Aggregate,	22	545	545	545	545	60		547	547	547	547	547	547	547	6091

The principal objection to the organization of our military establishment is this: there are four regiments of artillery, each regiment a distinct corps, and commanded by a Colonel; consequently, there is no head or central point to which the artillery can refer, and consequently there is very little chance of its improvement, while it remains without a head or chief. The artillery, besides having the charge of the ordnance department, is an arm of such importance that it ought to be cherished with the greatest care, and placed under the control of a general officer, who, besides having the command of all the forts on the seaboard, should, under the direction of the Secretary of War, superintend the armament of the fortresses building, and to be built; the furnishing of the arms for the infantry and cavalry of the regular army, and for the militia and volunteers of the several states, according to the acts of congress, and the exigencies growing out of particular circumstances, either of foreign aggression or domestic insurrection. The artillery department is one of the greatest moment to the government; as, without a due administration of what concerns that department, incalculable abuse, extravagance, and finally disaster, must ensue. The expenditure, in time of peace, which it involves, is considerable; but in time of war, it is enormous, and requires constant vigilance and attention to a strict accountability, to preserve the treasury from bankruptcy. To enumerate all the objects of expenditure under the control of the artillery department, would require a catalogue, in length equal to a common dictionary; but to present a few of those expensive articles, such as guns, gun-carriages, caisons, wagons and machinery, carts, horses, oxen, mules, muskets, pistols, swords, powder, lead, iron, harness, and equipments of all kinds, for a country like the

United States,—to say nothing of the factories, foundries, arsenals, magazines, and other edifices for the fabrication and preservation of what belongs to the artillery and ordnance,—will be sufficient, it is presumed, to show that this department is one which claims the special attention and supervision of the war department, to which the nation will look for a faithful administration of what appertains to it. This subject is dwelled upon the more, as it is believed to demand the greatest vigilance and care of the government; as it will be more or less useful, as it may be well or ill administered. It is proposed to form it into a separate department, under the immediate control of the war department. Its organization might with propriety consist of a general officer, who should be styled *Inspector General of Artillery*, one Brigade Major, and one Aid-de-Camp, to assist the General in the details of service, to be taken from the officers of artillery, without regard to rank; four Colonels Directors, commanding regiments; four Lieutenant Colonels, and four Majors, sub-directors—the regiments in other respects to remain as now organized for the peace establishment. It has been a subject of some doubt whether it would not be an improvement to restore the ordnance to its former state, by creating a separate corps for the ordnance, and no longer to take the officers of artillery to do the duty, by detail, as is now done. It is certain that any particular service is better performed by those who are in the constant practice of it, than by those who are occasionally called to execute, for a short time, that which has not been their previous study. If the present organization of the artillery is to give to all the officers of that arm a knowledge of the fabrication, construction, manipulation, and manufacture of what belongs to the ordnance, it

would no doubt improve the officers of artillery; but it is hardly to be expected that they can be proficient in both the manufacture and application of artillery; it is beyond a doubt better that their duties should be separate, in order to produce in each the requisite perfection. It is therefore proposed that the two services be separated, both on the score of economy and the perfection of these two important branches of the service. There ought to be a separate corps established, to be called the *Corps of Ordnance*, and placed under the direction of the commanding General of the artillery. This corps should be composed of the number of officers necessary for the service, consisting of the requisite number of field officers, captains and subalterns, corresponding with the extent of the duties and number of posts now occupied by the ordnance department. The artillery and ordnance may be considered as appertaining to the militia, as well as to the regular forces; they ought to control all that belongs to both, under their appropriate heads. The preparations which the artillery department should make, ought to embrace what will be necessary for the militia, as well as the regular army; and no park or detachment of artillery should be formed for the militia, without the proper proportion of directors, ordnance officers, conductors, &c. detailed from the regular army, so as to keep at all times the distribution and accountability in the hands of the national officers, more especially as the expense must be at the charge of the general government, and the responsibility rests with it. Enough, it is presumed, has been said, to show the great importance of the artillery department, and the necessity of its being placed under the most strict *surveilance* and accountability.

The infantry is very well organized at present, and

needs no alteration, except so far as designating a general officer, who should be charged with the exclusive command of that arm, to be styled *the General of Infantry.*— This division of command, and the separation of these two arms, the artillery and infantry, will naturally create an emulation to excel, which would result in much benefit to the public service, as well as to each one individually.

The engineer department, from the growing importance and increase of duties assigned to it, naturally requires an increase in numbers, and a more efficient organization—the organization to be such as to admit a gradual increase from the most distinguished of the cadets of the military academy, who are annually graduated, until the corps of engineers should double its present numbers; and the topographical engineers to be formed into a corps to correspond with the present organization of the corps of engineers, as at present the topographical engineers consist of six majors, and four captains; the other assistants are taken from the line of the army, and temporarily attached to the engineer service. For the want of officers of the corps of engineers, the engineer department is obliged to employ, at extravagant rates, individuals to do the duty of engineers; and thus the cost of the public works is greater than otherwise it would be, if officers sufficient were at the command of the engineer department, besides the certainty of having the duty properly performed, and the power of holding to a strict responsibility, those who bear the regular commission of the government, and who are subject to military law for any neglect of duty.

The engineer department, like that of the artillery, is not simply for the service of the regular army, but its officers may be considered as applicable to the militia ser-

vice, and may be ordered to act with the militia whenever it may be necessary; and such are the duties enjoined on the engineers, that both corps ought to be completed in time of peace, to an establishment suited to a state of war. The expense attending this arm, as regards its permanent support, is much less than that of any other; because it is composed solely of officers, who are liable to perform any duty the President may direct, either in superintending the construction of fortifications, internal improvements, in the staff, in the command of fortresses, or troops in the field, whether regulars or militia; so that the increase of these officers to a reasonable number, cannot but be beneficial to the public interest. The increase of expense for the pay of the additional officers will in reality be a considerable saving, as it will so much diminish the expense of hiring individuals less competent, and less interested for the public service, as before stated.

The general staff ought not to be considered merely the staff of the regular army, but as THE NATIONAL MILITARY STAFF, applicable alike to the regular and militia forces when called into the service of the United States; and no body of militia or volunteers should be called into the public service, without there being assigned to it a due proportion of regular staff officers of the different branches, to see to its wants, its organization, equipment, and efficiency for the public service. It is not meant, by this assignment of a regular staff to the militia, to interfere with the constitutional provision, that the militia should be commanded by its own officers. The staff has no direct command over the troops; it should be attached to the General appointed to the chief command, to assist him in the details of service, to provide the necessary means of instruction, the munitions, the trans-

port, quarters, hospitals, and hospital stores, pay, clothing, arms, and in fact, every thing necessary to render them effective, even as to organization and instruction. They should be mustered and inspected by the regular staff, and on such musters alone should they be paid. The staff being well acquainted with its duties, would easily disseminate among the militia, a due system of order and accountability, and by employing intelligent militia officers as assistants in the staff, form valuable staff officers from among the very militia itself. The cause of the great expense accompanying the employment of militia, and their inefficiency, is that of their being usually called into service without the accompanyment of a good staff. The General, or other officer commanding them, being without the necessary aids to carry into effect his intentions, and being obliged to do every thing himself, many important matters are of course neglected, the militia get dissatisfied and disheartened, become sickly, and finally either die or desert, for the want of many essentials to their comfort, discipline, and profitable employment. The general staff ought to be organized into *departments* or *corps*, and designated by some suitable denomination; and there ought to be grades among the officers similar to those of other corps in the service. For example, the Quarter Master's Department, or Corps of Quarter Masters; Subsistence Department, or Corps of Commissaries of Subsistence; Medical Department, or Corps of Physicians and Surgeons, &c. &c. Our present organization is in effect the same; but it does not sufficiently divide the grades among the officers in fair proportions to the regimental establishments of the line. By organizing the staff into corps, these several staff corps might be enlarged or diminished, without breaking in up-

on a regular system, and at the same time the officers belonging to these corps would have secured to them all the chances of promotion which officers in the line are in expectation of, and do actually enjoy. The graduated cadets of the military academy might with great propriety, and advantage to themselves and to the public, be employed in the several branches of the staff, previously to their joining their regiments; and if on trial some of them should manifest peculiar qualifications for staff employments, they might be continued therein, instead of hiring clerks to perform duties which they might very well perform: and by thus educating, as it were, additional staff officers, who might, as occasion should require, act as staff officers, thereby multiply the means of giving effect to the militia, and indeed to the regular forces, according to the plan indicated, as it regards the staff.

As the military establishment is very limited, and as the military academy supplies it with excellent officers, it has suggested itself that to render the rank and file more efficient, and to enable the government to extend the establishment to a greater number in time of war, that a valuable improvement might be made by filling the rank and file by a new method, and instructing them with a view to forming a corps of non-commissioned officers, who might be distributed into the new corps or militia, on the breaking out of a war; and thus with the officers and soldiers of the present establishment, the government would be enabled effectually to provide officers and non-commissioned officers for an army of one hundred thousand men, as great a number as this country would probably require under any circumstances for a long time to come.—The plan proposed is as follows: To enlist, with the consent of themselves and parents or guardians, a number of boys annually, to replace

the present soldiers of the army—these boys to be enlisted for fifteen years, and not to be under fourteen, nor more than sixteen years of age; to be assembled at two or more places, where schools should be established for their instruction, with a view of making them non-commissioned officers. They should be taught to read and write the English language—arithmetic and practical geometry—and to perform all the duties of private soldiers and non-commissioned officers: besides, they should be instructed in the mechanic arts, with a view to making them good artificers in iron, brass, wood, leather, &c. &c. and in the construction of carriages, machines, masonry, carpentry, and every other branch applicable to the military art, and which would be useful to them in civil life, after their discharge from the public service. Their pay for the first three years to be the half of the pay of a private soldier, with the full allowances of clothing, rations, &c. except the *liquor*, which should be abolished—then for the next three years, the full pay of a soldier; after which they should have the brevet rank and the pay and emoluments of a corporal for five years, and after that period the brevet rank and pay and emoluments of a sergeant; so that in time, the present army would become a corps of non-commissioned officers. On the same principle, a corps of excellent musicians may be created, if deemed necessary.—The operation should be gradual, so as to create one or more companies at a time, which would replace by degrees the rank and file of the present army, by relieving whole companies and garrisons at a time. These young soldiers, notwithstanding their having the grade of non-commissioned officers, should be liable to do all the duties of private soldiers, as well as those of non-commissioned officers; and such of them as should be selected and appointed to do the duty of non-

commissioned officers, should receive, while performing such duty, double pay. By this arrangement, it would be in the power of government to augment the army to one hundred thousand men; and in less than two months thereafter, they would be more efficient than our army was during the late war, after serving two years; because there would be competent officers and non-commissioned officers to instruct the new recruits, to attend to their wants and comforts, and render them efficient; who would account to government for the arms, clothing, munitions, &c. &c. furnished for the public service.

Besides affording the means of augmenting the regular army, incalculable benefits would result to the militia by the employment of suitable non-commissioned officers to instruct and drill the companies called into the public service. One commissioned officer as instructer to each militia battalion, to instruct the officers, and one non-commissioned officer as assistant instructer to each company, to instruct the non-commissioned officers and privates, would soon introduce into the militia, after they were called into the service of the United States, a sufficient degree of discipline and instruction to render them very efficient troops.

Thus it is that the proposed organization of the regular military peace establishment would render the militia effective when called out in defence of the country. A few days' training under accomplished officers and non-commissioned officers of the regular army, would introduce system, order, and efficiency into the militia battalions; and if continued in service for one year, and clothed, paid, and equipt by the United States, it would be difficult, at the end of six months, to distinguish them from the regular troops of the line.

To render the militia effective, and the duty enjoined upon them least burthensome and painful to the great mass of the people, when required to come forward in defence of the country, a specific organization and classification should be determined on by the national legislature at the present time, while we are enjoying profound peace. The present organization of the militia appears to be well suited to a state of peace; it is not therefore proposed to offer any alterations as it regards their peace establishment, but it is with a view of obtaining their services in times of war, that the proposed system is presented for consideration. The calling out of entire divisions, brigades, and regiments at a time, has been proved, in the late war to be not only expensive, but attended for the most part, with very little results, if any; and indeed it is well known to have been exceedingly distressing to the community, especially to those families, the heads or parents of which were drafted to perform military duty at a distance from home, leaving their families without their natural protectors and consequent support,—their occupations and farms neglected during their absence; so that instead of aiding in the means of defence, a positive loss must have been experienced, by the ruin at home and the consequences attendant on that condition, among a valuable class of citizens. In order to remedy this evil, and to make the call less heavy and painful on the community, it is proposed to divide the militia into *two classes*, one to be denominated THE ACTIVE, and the other SEDENTARY; the *active* to be subject to the drafts, to serve abroad, and the *sedentary* to remain for the home defence, and not liable to be called out, unless the enemy threaten their immediate vicinity, when they might form the garrisons of particular forts near at hand,

or do duty in their towns or villages, or be embodied only so long as the enemy should remain in their immediate neighbourhood, when every man ought to be ready to defend his fireside. The *active* militia should consist of all the unmarried men from sixteen to twenty-eight or thirty years of age, and the *sedentary* of all above that age, and all the married men, and heads of families. The drafts for service, by the United States, to be made on the *active*, by battalions; that is, the call should embrace a certain number of battalions; each battalion to consist of a certain number of officers and men, who should assemble and march to the place of rendezvous, where each battalion as it arrived, would be organized, mustered, inspected and numbered by an inspector from the regular staff; and on that inspection and muster, the pay rolls and requisitions for the necessary supplies alone would be made and issued. The battalion then would take a regular form, and receive the proper instruction from the instructers and assistant instructers, and for the term of one year would be to all intents and purposes a regular battalion. Every man thus drafted, who should serve faithfully for one year, unless sooner discharged, should receive *an honourable discharge*, which should forever thereafter exempt him from military duty, except in the sedentary militia, where every man, old and young, should be liable to do duty on emergencies. The battalions thus organized and embodied, should be kept up during the whole war, if the public service should require it, and be filled, by new drafts, three months before the expiration of the term of service of the old drafts, when, if the battalion should be full, one-half of the old soldiers might be discharged, and the remainder at the end of the year, so as to keep, at all times in service with the bat-

talion, a number of old soldiers, to give instruction and efficiency to the new drafts. The officers, like the soldiers, should be liable to be discharged at the end of their term of duty; that is, at the end of the year; but should any desire to remain longer in service, if approved by the General of the district, they might be continued during the whole time for which the battalion might be kept up, and promoted by the governors of their respective states on the recommendation of the commanding General and on the reports of the inspectors—all vacancies to be filled, on requisitions made by the general government, on the states respectively. The officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians and soldiers of the militia, to receive the same pay and emoluments as the officers, non-commissioned officers, musicians and soldiers of the regular army; be subject during that term of service to the same rules, regulations and discipline, and to be entitled to the same provision for wounds and disabilities, and the same benefits and allowances in every respect, as those belonging to the regular army.

The augmentation which the present army is capable of, is as follows:

CORPS OF ENGINEERS.

To be gradually increased to

1 Brigadier General, Chief Engineer, Inspector General of fortifications.

2 Colonels, directors.

4 Lt. Colonels, 4 Majors, } Sub-directors.

20 Captains.

20 First Lieutenants. Corps of sappers and miners, 400

CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS.

1 Colonel.
1 Lt. Colonel.
2 Majors.
6 Captains.
12 First Lieutenants.

ARTILLERY.

1 Brigadier General, Inspector Gen. of Artillery.

1 Colonel of Ordnance,
1 Lt. Colonel of ditto,
2 Majors,
10 Captains,
10 First Lieutenants,
10 Second Lieutenants,
} Corps of Ordnance.

4 REGIMENTS OF ARTILLERY, each regiment

1 Colonel,
2 Lt. Colonels,
2 Majors,
1 Adjutant,
} Field and Staff.

4 Sub-Adjutants,
4 Sub-Qt. Masters,
2 Chief Musicians,
} Non-commissioned Staff, with the pay and emoluments of Cadets.

20 Companies, 4 of which companies to be Light Artillery, each company to consist of

1 Captain.	8 Corporals.
2 First Lieutenants.	8 Artificers.
2 Second Lieutenants.	2 Musicians.
1 Sergeant Major.	120 Privates.
1 Qr. Master Sergeant.	——
4 Sergeants.	149

Then we would have 4 regiments of 20 companies each, of which there would be

16 Light Companies, 144 each,	2,304
14 Bat. Companies,	9,216
Total Artillery,	11,520

INFANTRY of the line,	40 Regts.	1000 strong,	40,000
CAVALRY	6 Regts.	500	3,000
			54,520

The Regiments of Infantry to furnish the Grenadiers, Light Infantry and Riflemen from their respective flank Companies.

40 Battalions of embodied militia, 1000 strong,	40,000
	94,520
Attached to the trains of the engineers, artillery, ordnance, Quarter Master's department, commissariat, hospital, &c., to be organized only under particular circumstances,	5,480
	100,000

Now let us proceed to show how this is to be done.

OF THE ARTILLERY.

The present establishment contains,

4 Colonels,	
4 Lieutenant Colonels,	
4 Majors, ...	12
40 Captains,	
76 1st Lieutenants,	
76 2d Lieutenants,	
76 Brevets, . . .	268

Proposed war establishment will require

4	Colonels,	
8	Lieutenant Colonels,	
8	Majors, . . .	20
80	Captains,	
160	1st Lieutenants,	
160	2d Lieutenants, . .	400

To be supplied 8 field officers and 132 company officers. The artillery could be officered out of the present corps of artillery, and the cadets of the military academy and the most prominent of the school of non-commissioned officers. The men to be obtained by enlistment.

INFANTRY.

To make the 40 regiments of infantry out of the present establishment of 7 regiments, and also the 6 regiments of cavalry—

Present establishment contains,

7	Colonels,	
7	Lieutenant Colonels,	
7	Majors, . . .	21
70	Captains,	
70	1st Lieutenants,	
70	2d Lieutenants,	
70	Brevets, ...	280

Proposed establishment,

46	Colonels,	
46	Lieutenant Colonels,	
46	Majors, ...	138

460 Captains,
460 1st Lieutenants,
460 2d Lieutenants, . . 1380

To each Regiment one effective Colonel from the field officers and Captains of the army, . . . 46

The Lieutenant Colonels and Majors from those not in service, officers who have served, or influential and respectable citizens, . . . 92

138

The Captains to be appointed from the remaining Captains and Lieutenants and cadets of the military academy; but we have left now, deducting the 46 Colonels from 301 officers, ... 255

To make up the number are required 205 } 460 Capts.
which must be taken from the cadets at West Point.

The Lieutenants to be taken from the prominent non-commissioned officers and from respectable young citizens. } 920

1380

RECAPITULATION.

The number of officers to be supplied from the officers, cadets, and non-commissioned officers,

for artillery 420
for infantry 506——926

Number of officers now in the artillery, 268
Number of officers of infantry, . . . 301
Number of cadets, say 200

769

Number of non-commissioned officers, supposed to be fit for officers out of the 6000, say 318, which is three to a company, ...	318
	1087
Number to be supplied, . . .	926
Leaving over, to make regimental staff officers,	161

The non-commissioned officers not promoted, to be distributed among the companies of artillery, infantry, and cavalry, so as to give to each company at least 6, and to the militia, one per company, as an assistant instructer. These last are to be selected for superior acquirements in the drill, and for exemplary conduct, and ought to receive the rank, pay, and emoluments of cadets.

But as it would not be wise to appoint any but efficient officers to command companies, it would be prudent to appoint in the first instance, but eight captains to a regiment; and after the first year, select, on the recommendation of the field officers of the regiment, from among the Lieutenants, 2 Captains to each regiment, to complete the establishment.

The distribution of the non-commissioned officers would be as follows:—

For the infantry and cavalry, . . .	3,000
For the artillery, ordnance, and engineers,	2,282
For the militia, ...	400
For promotion to Lieutenancies, and staff,	318
	6,000

In time of war, it will be necessary to organize a train for the artillery; a train for the engineers; a corps of arti-

ficers to be attached to the Quarter Master General's department; a corps of pontoniers to be attached to the engineers, besides the corps of sappers and miners.—The sappers and miners ought to be organized at present, as it is a service that requires a great deal of instruction. They might be usefully employed at the military academy, and in the fortifications. The corps of sappers and miners might be so organized as to have in its composition a valuable set of artificers, who would be very serviceable in the construction of forts and other military and civil edifices, under the direction of the engineers.

The other designated trains can so easily be put in operation under officers of the artillery and quarter master's department; that it is not necessary to organize, in time of peace, any thing of the kind; besides the talents of the officers for such service, there is such a wonderful facility in our country in obtaining excellent drivers, wagons and any thing which relates to transport, by land, that it is better to be left to the discretion of the staff of the artillery and to the Quarter Master General, than to attempt any system at this time; for we must have part water and part land carriage, and it requires only the presence of those excellent officers of the quarter master's department to put in motion all the transport that may be required. The artillery having its particular equipments, must have a train of its own, to suit the particular objects of that arm; because the whole is to operate in the field, in sieges and in the defence of places, according to the particular circumstances under which it may find itself, either at home or abroad. The United States are particularly blessed with a description of artificers, that can turn their talents to any account, either with the axe or the spade, the plough or the mechanic arts. Among all the implements of war,

the axe in this country may be accounted one of the most important, for with it we can erect or destroy wooden bridges or fell trees, and with the same instrument obstruct roads and approaches, and make them when they are wanted; we can construct batteries, build forts, barracks and cantonments, supply ourselves with fuel, and indeed do many things that are not known, except in this country where the axe is all important. It is therefore unnecessary to organize in time of peace in this country many of those establishments essential to military operations in other countries. We can command them at pleasure, both in the personal and the material, and at a rate and in a perfection that no government establishment can improve; but we must have laws to govern such establishments, when they are in the public employ, to prevent imposition, and to ensure a compliance with the mandates of authority, especially in time of war. All minor details are avoided in this memoir, which will so readily suggest themselves in time of war. The education of our officers and their constant improvement in the various branches of the science of war, will point out to the practical officer, the mode as well as the time to employ those things, which are only wanted on the immediate spur of the occasion, thereby avoiding all the expenses attendant on a permanent establishment of those costly equipages.

For a force of 94,520 we should require the following number and description of general officers at the commencement:

Four Major Generals.

Eight Brigadiers, besides those now in service; the number of the general officers eventually to be increased to twenty Brigadiers and eight Major Generals to command the troops in the field, independent of the general

officers who may be employed in the staff, as chiefs of the staff, engineers, artillery, inspectors general, and heads of the several branches of administration, as Quarter Master General, &c. The staff must be complete in time of war, or the troops will never become efficient, but will be an irregular and expensive corps, on which no reliance could be placed. It is the staff alone that can give efficiency to the service, by a proper attention to the necessary supplies, organization, discipline, and accountability of all the departments of the service, regular as well as irregular. The general officers and staff officers should be selected with great care, for on them depends the successful employment of the troops, and the general defence of the country. They should all be men of character, talents and experience, in whom the nation and the army could confide; and not those who from popular favour may for the moment have been brought into view, and who in the first reverse will lose the confidence of the army and the people.

It may be supposed from the foregoing organization and remarks, that the sedentary militia are to be excluded from a participation in the defence of the country in time of war,—that is not the intention of this plan; it is to relieve them from taking the field for any length of time. They may be employed, as it has been before observed, under their present organization in defence of the cities, ports or harbors. The uniform or volunteer corps to preserve all their privileges, their dress, &c. but instead of carrying them off to the lines, or employing or quartering them in barracks at a distance from home, they will be left at liberty to pursue their avocations as usual, but immediately on a threatened invasion of their immediate vicinity, they will be embodied, and occupy the forts or

entrenchments intended for the defence of their city, town, village or immediate vicinity, and do duty in a regular manner as long as the enemy may invest the place, or linger in their neighbourhood; to march off into distant parts they will not be required, such service being reserved for the regular troops, and the embodied drafted battalions of the active militia, as before suggested.

A TABLE, showing the number of Men and Officers which each State and Territory would furnish, according to the plan for drafting the Militia to serve for one year, agreeably to the census of 1820.

State and Territory.	Number of men from 16 to 28 years of age in each State & Territory.	Quota to be furnished by each State and Territory, to make up the 40,000.	Number of Battalions & Companies.		Designation and Number of Officers.				
			Bns.	*Cps.*	*Lieut. Colonels.*	*Majors.*	*Captains.*	*1st Lieuts.*	*2d Lieuts.*
Maine,	28,530	1,468	1	5	2	1	15	15	15
New Hampshire,	22,703	1,168	1	2	1	2	12	12	12
Massachusetts,	49,506	2,547	2	5	2	3	25	25	25
Rhode Island,	7,596	390		4		1	4	4	4
Connecticut,	25,831	1,327	1	3	1	1	13	13	13
Vermont,	24,137	1,241	1	3	1	1	13	13	13
New York,	134,753	6,931	6	9	7	7	69	69	69
New Jersey,	24,639	1,267	1	3	1	1	13	13	13
Pennsylvania,	102,550	5,273	5	3	5	5	53	53	53
Delaware,	5,516	284		3		1	3	3	3
Maryland,	26,404	1,357	1	4	2	1	14	14	14
Virginia,	58,863	3,015	3		3	3	30	30	30
North Carolina,	39,527	2,032	2		2	2	20	20	20
South Carolina,	23,984	1,233	1	2	2	1	12	12	12
Georgia,	19,483	1,002	1		1	1	10	10	10
Alabama,	9,336	481		5	1		5	5	5
Mississippi,	4,560	234		2		1	2	2	2
Louisiana,	8,747	450		5	1		5	5	5
Tennessee,	31,028	1,596	1	6	1	2	16	16	16
Kentucky,	41,328	2,125	2	1	2	2	21	21	21
Ohio,	57,008	2,932	2	9	3	3	29	29	29
Indiana,	14,428	741		7	1		7	7	7
Illinois,	6,224	319		3		1	3	3	3
Missouri,	6,537	335		3	1		3	3	3
Michigan,	1,334	68		1			1	1	1
Arkansas,	1,427	73		1			1	1	1
Dist. Columbia,	2,171	111		1			1	1	1
	778,150	40,000	40	90	40	40	400	400	400

REVIEW

OF THE

"MEMOIR ON THE ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE UNITED STATES, WITH A VIEW TO ITS GIVING EFFECT TO THE MILITIA WHEN CALLED INTO ACTUAL SERVICE."

It is gratifying to see that the circular letter of the Hon. James Barbour, Secretary of War, of the 11th July, 1826, on the subject of the militia, addressed to the governors of the several states and territories, the general and other officers of the militia, and to the officers of the army, and others interested, begins to attract the attention of those who are capable of aiding in the great undertaking which that circular offers for consideration.—The subject is one of vital importance to the nation at large, and notwithstanding it claimed the early attention of the general government, as far back as its first going into operation under the new constitution, there has, as yet, been no system established, by which the militia could be rendered effective.

Under the administration of General Washington, the attempt was first made to exercise the general power, granted by the constitution to the national legislature, "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the

militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States."

Finding that there was an almost universal opposition on the part of the people to maintaining, in time of peace, a regular army, growing out of the ancient hue and cry against such establishments in England, when it was believed that the military were embodied to oppose the people in their just claims to certain privileges, and when, perhaps, such really was the case, General Washington took repeated occasions to impress on congress the necessity of organizing the militia as early as possible, and stated, in his speech at the opening of the second session, that, "among the interesting objects that would engage the attention of congress, that of providing for the common defence, would merit its particular regard. To be prepared for war is one of the most effectual means of preserving peace. A free people ought not only to be armed but disciplined; to which end, an uniform and well-digested plan is requisite, and their safety and interest require that they should promote such manufactories as tend to render them independent on others for essential, particularly for military supplies."

During the next session of congress, an act was passed for establishing an uniform militia.

Although General Washington was very anxious to establish, as early as possible, a system for the militia, knowing the repugnance of the people at large to a regular army, as before observed, and that, therefore, no other means of defence could be obtained with the consent of the people, under the impressions which then existed, it was by no means his opinion that that species of force was either the most economical or least dangerous to the liberties of the citizen: for, in this country, the soldier, enlisted

with his own free will and consent, could be regarded in no other light than a volunteer in the cause of his country—still he believed it was better to have some description of force, in reality or in name, rather than that the new government should appear in the eyes of the world without any means of defence at its command. Besides, General Washington was desirous that the information, discipline, and experience, which were still existing among the remaining revolutionary officers and soldiers, should not be suffered to die away, but be introduced under the sanction of a law, among the people, who should be enrolled in the militia; fearing that, should the opportunity pass away unimproved, such an advantage would not again occur, unless, unfortunately, the United States should be again involved in a long and arduous war.

Washington had no reliance on the militia, nor had any other commander in the revolutionary or the last war. It is true, however, that many who had the command of the militia, from motives of policy, and for the purpose of impressing on the enemy a belief that the militia were exceedingly powerful, and that much reliance was placed on their exertions, did publish, in general orders, flattering accounts of their prowess, both to deceive the enemy and to encourage the militia to come forth in defence of their country.

While this species of deception may be warranted as a *ruse de guerre*, and have its effect in war, it has nevertheless produced great mischief, by giving a reputation to the militia, for efficiency, which they never merited, and thus that description of force has been too much relied on, as sufficient for all the purposes of defence—a reliance of a most dangerous tendency. The organization and system under which they could be employed, were exceed-

ingly defective. They were, when called into the public service, a moth on the treasury. They cost twice as much as regular soldiers, and rendered hardly any service whatever. They were without discipline, discontented, badly officered, and miserably provided with every thing which was essential to their utility. These are facts which cannot be disputed, and ought not to be concealed. No unworthy imputation is here meant to be cast on the individual character of those who compose the militia—it is to expose the imperfection of the system under which their services were required.

The plan for organizing and employing the militia, proposed in the *memoir*, seems to have been written by one who is well acquainted with the subject, and the suggestions which it contains with regard to the improvement of the regular forces, and of the mode of rendering efficient the militia, when called into the service of the United States, or in other words, when employed in war, appear to be very judicious, and as far as we are capable of judging, the best yet offered for the public consideration, both on the score of economy and efficiency.

The organization of the general staff into separate departments or corps, seems to be very proper, and highly advantageous: and that these staff corps should be the *main spring* of the regular and irregular forces, appears, under the views presented, as well calculated to produce that harmony and unity of action, which constitute the basis of discipline, and the strength of armies.

An army is efficient in proportion as its staff is well organized, and the members composing it honest, industrious, and intelligent. It will be of little avail, if the individual regiments, battalions, or corps, which compose an army, are in a high state of discipline, and well organiz-

ed, if the general staff, which directs the whole, is incompetent to fulfil its important functions. Such an army, however patriotic and gallant, would soon have to submit to one of equal, nay, of less number of troops of inferior quality, under the guidance of a staff well organized, and composed of officers of experience, and well versed in their various and complicated duties: for while the troops of the former description would be daily diminishing in strength and discipline under an ill-regulated and ignorant staff, the latter would be improving in force and discipline by the good management and care of its excellent staff. It is not the individual exertions of corps, however spirited, that decide a campaign—it is the talent with which they are directed as a whole, and the means employed to maintain discipline, to provide for their comfort and subsistence, and the numerous supplies requisite for carrying on the war. Hence the suggestion of having officers of the regular army to compose the heads of the staff for the militia, and for instructing them in their duties, appears not only reasonable, but very feasible, and, as the writer of the memoir says, *important*—inasmuch as the general government is bound to supply the militia, when in the public service.

Whether the system of recruiting the regular army, by engaging young lads and instructing them, will answer, the experiment alone can decide; it appears, however, not to be impracticable, and it is well worth the trial. Should it succeed, it will render our small military establishment very valuable, efficient, and economical; and its application to the militia, as the means of giving that portion of the military force, organization and efficiency, may be esteemed an important consideration.

As it regards the militia, the distinction made between

the *war and peace establishments*, appears both reasonable and judicious. The militia have two duties to perform: One is to suppress rebellion, the other to repel invasion. The present organization is sufficient for the maintenance of order and suppression of rebellion, and is therefore well calculated for a state of peace. But to make the militia a means of defence against foreign invasion, there must be an organization adapted to meet a state of war. The classification of the militia into *active* and *sedentary*, as proposed in the memoir, certainly possesses many important advantages. It leaves the elderly and married men at home to defend their firesides, while it does not draw them from their ordinary employments, and the immediate care of their families; at the same time possessing all the advantages as to organization, which the militia at present possess; and the young men who are unmarried, can be employed any where, free from the cares of home, and all those miseries which they would suffer were they married and separated from their wives and children. This organization has not, however, the merit of originality. It was practised by the Canadian government in the late war, with great success. No troops could have presented a better appearance than the battalions of Canadian militia in Lower Canada, composed of young men, incorporated during the war. The men were, however, drafted to serve for one year only, and were quartered, dressed, and equipped like the troops of the line of the British army, so that the experiment may be said to have been made with success. There have been various propositions for improving the state of discipline among the militia, or rather for instructing the militia. General Knox, Secretary of War, in his report to Congress during the administration of Washington, proposed, if our memory serves us, that

the militia should be encamped three months in the year, and perform, during that term, all the duties of a soldier, and experience all the varieties incident to a military life. In theory, this plan appears exceedingly well, but to put it in practice, would require large sums of money; the three months would be passed like a frolic, accompanied with vicious indulgence, instead of resulting in any practical good; but, on the contrary, it would give to those called out, habits totally different from their avocations, which would unfit them for the ordinary pursuits of life. It has also been proposed to call out the officers and non-commissioned officers, a certain number of days in each year. This plan appears better than the first; but, like it, if the officers and non-commissioned officers are to be paid, the expense would be burthensome, and the results but little better than the former. On the whole, we are inclined to believe that the plan proposed in the memoir, is the best, and most practicable; namely, that of leaving the militia for the peace establishment, as they are now organized; and for the war establishment, to divide them into *active* and *sedentary*. The first to be embodied like regular troops, and act abroad when required; and the latter to serve at home, only on emergencies.

The proper period for receiving instruction is youth, and as every pains is taken to educate our youth in the rudiments of their language, in arithmetic, and in dancing, and gymnastic exercises, it appears to us that the military exercises should also form a part of early education, and thus avoid the trouble and loss of time, which is occasioned by the present mode of attempting to drill the militia, after they have arrived at manhood. We would then suggest a plan for instructing the militia, by teaching our young lads at schools, and in the colleges, the military exercises, and

make it a national and general object. Suppose for instance that the teachers of schools should be licensed in each state by the proper authorities; that such of the teachers as would instruct their pupils in the military art, as far as the *School of the Company*, should be compensated at a certain rate per boy, say one dollar per annum, to be paid by the general government, on the certificate of the Inspector of the district or brigade, within which the school might be situated, who should make a report to the Adjutant General of the state, of the number of boys at the schools within his district or brigade, to be laid before the Governor of the state, for the information of the legislature; and also a similar return to the war department, for the use of congress; and that each college in the union should be endowed by congress with a professor of the military art, in the higher branches. The plan is not so difficult as one would, at first, suppose; for it would be only necessary in each school, to instruct three or four of the most intelligent and best behaved boys in the first instance, who might be made the Captains and Lieutenants of the company, who would, after being well grounded in their duty, as set forth in the military regulations, instruct the other boys of the school. The officers and non-commissioned officers should be selected for their exemplary conduct, and it should be considered a great distinction to enjoy the offices. They should be furnished with wooden arms; they should be carefully taught how to stand firm, march, and wheel, and go through the manual exercises.

Every morning they should assemble on the parade ground before the school; the roll should be called in conformity with the regulations; after which they should march into school, and deposite their arms. Each Wednesday and Saturday afternoon should be exclusively de-

voted to the drill, when the school should appear in some neat, simple uniform. On particular days there should be, under the direction of the Brigade Major, a general muster of all the schools in his district, when they should be incorporated and formed into battalions, and manœuvred as such under his particular care. This would afford an opportunity of comparing the state of discipline in the several schools or companies. The general and field officers of the militia should attend and review the battalions, and publish in orders, through the Brigade Major, their opinion of the appearance, skill, and advancement in their military exercises, of each school. Take for example, the district of Columbia; suppose that every school therein formed a company, each company in a neat uniform, say a blue nankeen jacket and white pantaloons, black hat and white feather; and each with a flag to designate the company, should march up from their respective school houses, and assemble on the President's square, and there, under the direction of the Inspector of the militia, be formed into battalions and brigades. The young gentlemen of the colleges, who had advanced to the evolutions of the battalion and line, to take command of the battalions and brigades, and to perform the duty of adjutants, field and general officers. We might then see, in the course of a year, about 1600 or 2000 boys forming a most beautiful line, and exercising with a precision, which the militia of the district could not obtain under their present regulation or mode of instruction. In the large cities, like New York, Philadelphia, Boston, and Baltimore, a small army might be paraded. The sight would be beautiful and highly interesting. The youth, when once instructed, would never forget the drill and evolutions. In confirmation of this assertion, it is well known that those who learn to dance when they are young, never forget the most complicated

figures or difficult steps, while it is almost impossible to teach grown persons to dance or even to learn the figures of different dances. Dances are only steps, evolutions, and manœuvres, and they are generally more difficult than the steps, marches, wheelings, and evolutions, which form the basis of the military movements. This plan cannot be carried into effect without the aid of the general government; and all the aid required from it, is to pay one dollar per head, which, while it will lay the groundwork of making a good militia, it will in fact be aiding in the general system of education throughout the union, as the money spent will enable the masters to maintain themselves, and consequently to attend to their duties as teachers: for in many of the country places they get so little compensation in cash, that they are barely able to live. The objections which will be urged against this plan will be, that it will have a tendency to make the nation military, and thus give a propensity to war, which may lead us into difficulties, and perhaps furnish some designing character the means of usurping the reins of government, and thus destroy our republican institutions; but we cannot conceive that fear to be well grounded. Have we not always been endeavouring to make our militia effective, to arm and discipline them? Are not the people enlightened and well acquainted with the nature of our institutions, and will they voluntarily sell themselves to a tyrant or usurper? No; the thing is preposterous. Only educate the youth with care, and they will, when they grow up, know how to value the rights and privileges of an American citizen; and while they have arms in their hands, and know how to use them, will be more likely to maintain those rights and privileges than barter them for the smiles of a usurper, however dignified in assumed titles, or powerful by the support of traitors and unprincipled adherents.

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